" [L] ong before the adoption of the Constitution the common law courts in the Colonies-and later in the States during the period of the Confederation-were exercising jurisdiction in rem in the enforcement of [English and local] forfeiture statutes," which provided for the forfeiture of commodities and vessels used in violations of customs and revenue laws. And, almost immediately after adoption of the Constitution, ships and cargoes involved in customs offenses were made subject to forfeiture under federal law, as were vessels used to deliver slaves to foreign countries, and somewhat later those used to deliver slaves to this country. The enactment of forfeiture statutes has not abated; contemporary federal and state forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of property that might be used in the conduct of criminal enterprise. 15 Despite the potential reach of forfeiture statutes, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld forfeiture statutes when confronted with constitutional challenges by innocent owners. 16 In so doing, the Court has usually justified the forfeiture on either of two grounds: (1) that the property itself is guilty of the offense; or (2) that the property owner may be held accountable for the wrongdoings of those to whom he entrusts his property. 17
The Guilty Property Fiction
The earliest American civil forfeiture cases justifying the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property were condemnation actions against ships for acts of piracy or violations of United States customs laws. 18 In upholding such forfeitures, the Supreme Court invoked the "guilty property" fiction to justify in rem proceedings directly against the ship, rather than in personam proceedings against the ship-owners. 19 The in rem nature of the admiralty proceedings dispensed with 19 Although the "guilty property" fiction is reminiscent of the justification for forfeiture under the law of deodand, the use of the fiction in admiralty proceedings may have developed out of necessity and practicality, rather than as a genuine belief that the property itself was guilty of wrongdoing. See Tamara [Vol. 87 CIVL FORFEITURE the requirement of proving any underlying wrongdoing on the part of the property owner.
In The Palmyra, 20 the United States Supreme Court determined that a statutory, in rem forfeiture of property was "independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam" against the property owner. 2 1 Pursuant to an act of Congress authorizing the capture and condemnation of any vessel from which piratical aggression was attempted or made, the United States sought the forfeiture of a ship, The Palmyra, suspected of privateering 22 under a commission from the King of Spain. 2 3 The ship owner asserted that the government could not maintain the condemnation action because he had not been criminally convicted of privateering. 2 4 Rejecting this contention, the Court reasoned that " [t] he thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing."2 Furthermore, the Court noted that acceptance of the ship owner's argument would prohibit the forfeiture of any vessel pursuant to the act of Congress because there was no authorization for the criminal punishment of one who commits piratical aggression. 2 6 Since such a requirement would make the statute inoperable, the Court held that a criminal conviction was not necessary to enforce an in rem forfeiture of this nature. Similarly, in Harmony v. United States 2 8 the Court upheld the forfeiture of a ship for acts of piracy notwithstanding the ship owners' lack of knowledge or authorization of the aggressions. 29 In Harmony, a ship, armed with the usual equipment for an innocent commercial voyage, committed acts of aggression that were admittedly outside the Piety discusses Holmes's theory that in rem proceedings against ships developed because the ship was the only security available when dealing with foreigners. It (citing O.W. Houm~s, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881)). Seizing the vessel was a way to obtain jurisdiction over a foreigner or to ensure a remedy for a citizen, rather than forcing the citizen to search for a remedy abroad. 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW contemplation of the ship owner. 8 0 The Court reasoned that treating the vessel as the offender was the "only adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring indemnity to the injured party." 31 As further support for attaching the offense to the vessel, the Court reasoned that, because a ship is guided by its crew and master, it was not unreasonable that the master's actions affect the ship. Outside the realm of admiralty law, the Court continued to premise the forfeiture of illegally-used property on the notion that the offense attaches directly to the property. 3 3 In addition, the Court began to examine the relationship between the property owner and the person using the property illegally. 3 4 In Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 3 5 the Court upheld the forfeiture of the real and personal property of a distillery occupied and operated by a lessee who failed to maintain the distillery's business records in accordance with United States revenue laws. 3 6 The Court maintained that the forfeiture action attached to the distillery and did not require proof of the lessorowner's knowledge that the lessee committed fraud upon the government. 8 7 The Court explained that the fact that the lessor-owner consented to his land being used as a distillery put him in the same place as if he was the distiller, and subjected the land to forfeiture just as if the distiller was the owner. 3 8 In conclusion, the Court determined that by virtue of the lease, the acts of the lessee bind the lessor-owner and the consequences to the property were the same as if the owner committed the illegal acts. 3 9
The Entrustment Theory
Although the use of the "guilty property" fiction in Anierican civil forfeiture actions operates under the premise that the guilt or innocence of the property owner is irrelevant, the Supreme Court's appli- ,612) ). The court also discussed the notion that "the acts of the master and crew... bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs." Id. at 234. However, the basis of the Court's judgment of forfeiture was the ship's accountability for the wrongdoing, not the owner's accountability for the illegal acts of the crew. 43 the Court, in upholding the forfeiture of an automobile used to transport alcohol illegally, offered a rationale other than the "guilty property" fiction for allowing the forfeiture of property misused without the owner's knowledge or consent. 44 The Court determined that the government was justified in "visiting upon the owner of property, the unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized action of one to whom he has intrusted [sic] it. "45 The Court began by noting that a State's police power permits it to declare certain uses of property undesirable and to subject the property to forfeiture if the owner so uses it. 46 The Court then reasoned that an owner surrenders control of his property at his own peril and, by subjecting property to forfeiture for the illegal acts of those to whom the property is entrusted, the law "builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner." 47 As such, the Court determined that the State validly exercised its police power by forfeiting the car. 48 For that reason as well as the well-settled precedents allowing forfeiture of property entrusted by innocent owners to wrongdoers, 49 
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Similarly, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,51 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Puerto Rican statute providing grounds for the forfeiture of a boat upon which marijuana was found, notwithstanding the boat-leasing company's lack of knowledge of the lessee's criminal activity. 52 After surveying the forfeiture precedents, the Court concluded that the Puerto Rican forfeiture statute furthered punitive and deterrent purposes that had traditionally sufficed to withstand the constitutional challenges made by innocent owners. 53 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that application of forfeiture provisions to "lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing... may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property." ' 4 Concluding that the leasing company did not allege, nor offer proof, that it "did all that it reasonably could to avoid having its property put to unlawful use," the Court upheld the confiscation. Although the Supreme Court has consistently declined to limit the government's power to forfeit the property of innocent owners, the Court offered some protection against abuse of this power by applying the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause to civil forfeiture in Austin v. United States. 56
B. APPLICATION OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE TO CIVIL FORFEITURE
In Austin, the Supreme Court again addressed the constitutionality of civil forfeiture; however, the attack was not a due process claim by an innocent owner. 57 Rather, the Court examined whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to a civil forfei-51 416 U.S. 663 (1974). [T]he same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive. 
698
[Vol. 87
CIVL FORFETURE
ture. 58 In holding that the Excessive Fines Clause limited the government's power to confiscate property, the Court examined both the historical purpose of civil forfeiture and the history of the Eighth Amendment. 59 The Court first noted that the text of the Excessive Fines Clause, unlike other constitutional provisions, did not limit its protection to the context of criminal proceedings. 60 Furthermore, the Court noted that the historical purpose of the provision was to "prevent the government from abusing its power to punish." 6 ' Thus, the Court concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to any punitive governmental action, either civil or criminal in nature.
62
Next, the Court addressed whether civil forfeiture generally serves a punitive purpose. 63 The Austin Court examined the history of civil forfeiture both in English and American law and concluded that forfeiture generally, and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular, serve as punishment. 64 Furthermore, the Court noted that even its decisions upholding the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property, under either the guilty property or entrustment theories, "rest, at bottom, on the notion that the owner has been negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that he is properly punished for that negligence." 65 The Court also examined the history of the particular forfeiture statute applied in Austin and reached the conclusion that, like civil forfeiture generally, the specific statute served punitive purposes.
66
The Court rejected the government's claim that forfeitures of instruments of the drug trade were remedial and compensatory in nature. 67 Noting that the government possesses a remedial interest in confiscating contraband, the Court emphasized that the property at issue in 66 Id. at 619-22. In Austin, the government sought the forfeiture of a mobile home and an auto body shop pursuant to a federal statute authorizing the forfeiture of property used in drug trafficking. 1d. at 604-05 (citing 21 U.S.C. § § 881 (a) (4) and (a)(7) (1988)).
67 Id-at 620-21.
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Austin, a mobile home and an auto-body shop, were not contraband. 68 Furthermore, the Court stated that the "dramatic variations in the value of conveyances and real property forfeitable under § § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) undercut any ... argument" that the forfeitures serve to compensate the government for the cost of law enforcement. 6 9 Thus, the Court concluded that the forfeiture in Austin was subject to the limitation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
70
The Austin Court declined to promulgate a test for determining when a civil forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. 7 ' Rather, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for such determination.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of October 3, 1988, two police officers observed a woman "flagging" passing vehicles on a street corner in a Detroit neighborhood reputed for prostitution. 73 The [Vol. 87
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In an unreported decision issued from the bench, the trial judge determined that Mr. Bennis had engaged in an act of lewdness and ordered the forfeiture of the Bennises' automobile. 79 Furthermore, he ordered the vehicle's sale with the proceeds to be used to cover the costs of prosecution and law enforcement, with any remainder to be turned over to the State. 8 0
At trial, Mrs. Bennis testified that she had no knowledge that her husband would use their car to solicit prostitutes, nor did she know that, on the day of the incident, he would use the car for any purpose other than to come directly home from work. 81 In determining that both Mr. and Mrs. Bennis's interests in the car should be abated, the judge commented that, under other circumstances, he would have considered the independent interest of Mrs. Bennis in the automobile. 82 In this case, however, he would not do so because the Bennises owned another automobile and because there would be "practically nothing left" of the sale proceeds after deducting the relevant costs.
83
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision on several grounds. 8 4 First, the court held that, as a matter of law, Michigan's nuisance statute required the prosecution to prove that Mrs. Bennis knew of her husband's use of the vehicle as a nuisance before the vehicle could be abated. 85 Second, the court found that, given the facts of this case, the prosecution failed to prove that Mrs. Bennis had such knowledge. 86 Additionally, the court determined that the single incident in the Bennis vehicle was insufficient to create a nuisance for the purpose of the statute because a reasonable inference could not be drawn that such conduct was habitual. 87 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW the court found that since the prosecution offered no proof that Mr. Bennis paid money in exchange for sex, his conduct did not constitute lewdness to the extent required to subject the vehicle to forfeiture under the statute. 88 The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's order forfeiting the Bennis' automobile. 89 The court found that Mr. Bennis had engaged in an act of lewdness squarely within the purview of the nuisance statute. 90 Furthermore, the court determined that Mr. Bennis's single act of lewdness sufficiently constituted a nuisance given that the act occurred in an area known for prostitution, thereby contributing to an already existing public nuisance. 9 1 Finally, the court held that the statute did not require proof of Mrs. Bennis's knowledge of the nuisance in order to forfeit her interest in the vehicle.
92
After determining that the Michigan statute subjected Mrs. Bennis's interest in the car to forfeiture, the court examined the constitutional significance of the abatement. 9 3 The court assumed that Mrs. Bennis did not have knowledge of or consent to her husband's illegal use of the vehicle. 94 Examining the decisions in Van Oste' 5 and Calero-Toledo, 9 6 the court determined that the United States Supreme Court allows forfeiture of an innocent owner's property based on misuse of the property by others. 97 Specifically, the court relied on Van Oster, citing the Supreme Court's rejection of an innocent owner's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim when the offense was "committed by one entrusted by the owner with the possession and use of the offending vehicle." 98 The court noted that Mrs. Bennis, as a joint owner of the car, explicitly or implicitly entrusted Mr. Bennis 1981) (holding that a single incident of solicitation for prostitution in a bar was insufficient to create a nuisance unless a reasonable inference could be drawn that the conduct was habitual)). Initially, the Court noted that the basis of Mrs. Bennis's due process claim was not that the State denied her notice or an opportunity to contest the forfeiture of her interest in the car. 10 5 Rather, Mrs. Bennis claimed an entitlement to contest the abatement by establishing her lack of knowledge that her husband would use the vehicle to violate the law. 10 6 In rejecting this claim, the Court examined a "long and unbroken line of cases" holding that an owner's interest in property could be forfeited because of others' illegal use of the property regardless of whether the owner knew the property would be put to such use. Next, ChiefJustice Rehnquist surveyed cases outside the realm of admiralty law to further support the Court's position that an innocent owner's interest may be subject to forfeiture for the wrongful acts of those to whom the owner entrusts the property." 3 The majority opinion highlighted Van Oster,1" 4 in which the Court upheld the forfeiture of a car used to illegally transport alcohol, despite the owner's claimed lack of knowledge or authorization of the illegal transport." 5 Furthermore, the Court emphasized the well-established principle that due process does not protect an owner against the consequences of the unlawful acts of those to whom the owner entrusts the property." However, the Calero-Toledo Court went on to uphold the forfeiture of the interest of a yacht leasing company in a yacht which the lessee used to transport drugs even though the company had no knowledge Next, the Court acknowledged that previous forfeiture cases specifically reserved the question of whether an innocent owner's interest in illegally-used property could be forfeited when the property had been stolen from the owner or used without the owner's knowledge or consent. 124 However, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that since Mr. Bennis was a co-owner of the vehicle, the Court was not required to make such a determination in this case.' 25 Furthermore, the ChiefJustice rejected Mrs. Bennis's suggestion that the Court overrule the precedents "by importing a culpability requirement from cases having at best a tangential relation to the 'innocent owner' doctrine of the forfeiture cases."' 2 6 Mrs. Bennis cited Foucha v. Louisiana, 12 7 for the proposition that a criminal defendant cannot be punished for a crime without proof that he is guilty.' 28 The majority found unpersuasive Mrs. Bennis' argument that the Foucha holding mandated that Michigan demonstrate a punitive interest in forfeiting Mrs. Bennis's interest in the vehicle. 1 29 Reservingjudgment on whether the forfeiture proceeding was punitive, the Court stated that the Foucha decision did not discuss, let alone overrule the forfeiture cases. 130 Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed Mrs. Bennis's reliance on the Austin Court's holding that the Excessive Fines Clause limits the scope of civil forfeiture.1 3 ' Mrs. Bennis argued that the Austin holding "would be difficult to reconcile with any rule allowing truly innocent persons to be punished by civil forfeiture." 1 3 2 ChiefJustice 127 504 U.S. 71 (1992). In Foucha, the Supreme Court held that a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity could not be confined indefinitely unless the State showed that the defendant was either dangerous or mentally ill. The Foucha Court reasoned that without a showing of dangerousness or insanity, the State had no "punitive interest" to justify detention. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80). Thus, Mrs. Bennis argued that Michigan had to demonstrate a valid punitive purpose for forfeiting her interest in the vehicle before the State could impose that "punishment" upon her. See Bennis, 115 S. Ct. at 1000. 
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Rehnquist noted that the Austin Court did not address the validity of the "innocent-owner defense," except to opine that the existence of such a defense in the forfeiture statute evidenced the punitive nature of the forfeiture. 5 5 Furthermore, he noted that Michigan's abatement proceedings were not purely punitive, but, rather, were equitable actions in which the trial court had remedial discretion to consider alternatives other than abating the entire interest in the vehicle.' 3 4 The Court also pointed out that forfeiture served a deterrent purpose distinct from punishment. 135 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed Mrs. Bennis's Fifth Amendment claim.' 5 6 The Court determined that Michigan lawfully acquired the Bennises' vehicle because the forfeiture did not offend due process.' 5 7 Noting that the government is not required to compensate an owner for property lawfully taken, other than through the exercise of eminent domain, the Court held that the State was not required to compensate Mrs. Bennis for her interest. JUSTICE THOMAS'S CONCURRENCE Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion that acknowledged the apparent inequity of allowing the State to forfeit a property owner's interest without proving any wrongdoing by the property owner. 139 He pointed out, however, that the Constitution does not prohibit all that is undesirable. 140 Justice Thomas also reiterated the majority's position that the Constitution permits the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property and that precedent supports such forfeitures. 14 1
Justice Thomas noted the State has a valid, remedial interest in abating the vehicle to prevent future criminal activity and deducting the costs of law enforcement from the sale proceeds. 142 Furthermore, as the trial court determined that a division of the proceeds would yield almost nothing, Justice Thomas characterized the forfeiture of [Vol. 87
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Mrs. Bennis's interest in the vehicle without compensation as remedial, rather than punitive. 14 Therefore, Justice Thomas reasoned that the forfeiture avoided the problems associated with imposing punishment upon an innocent individual.1 4 4
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate opinion to "highlight features of the case key to [her] judgment"' 45 She began by noting that the car belonged to John Bennisjust as much as it belonged to Tina Bennis, and, at all times, he had her permission to use it.
14 6 Justice Ginsburg emphasized that no one contested Michigan's right to forfeit the automobile. 14 7 She pointed out that the sole question was whether Tina Bennis had a constitutional right to a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the car. 148 Justice Ginsburg noted that Michigan's abatement proceedings are "equitable action [s] ," which the Michigan Supreme Court "stands ready to police" against "exorbitant application" and "inequitable administration." 1 49 Furthermore, she emphasized that the trial court based its decision not to divide the proceeds of the sale on the practical consideration that the age and value of the forfeited car left almost nothing to be divided and that the Bennises had another car. 150 In short, the trial court had not acted "blatantly unfairly," nor had the State "embarked on an experiment to punish innocent third parties." 151 Thus, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, Michigan's endeavor to rid its neighborhoods of illicit activity did not warrant the Court's disapproval.
2
D. JUSTICE STEVENS'S DISSENT
Justice Stevens dissented due to his belief that the majority's decision would allow the government "virtually unbridled power" to confiscate property used in illegal acts.' 5 8 Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's "apparent assumption" that the Constitution im-posed no limitation on the government's authority to seize property from innocent owners. 1 54 Finally, Justice Stevens asserted that the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis's interest in the car should have been reversed on due process grounds and as a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause. 155 Justice Stevens began his analysis by dividing seizable property into three categories: pure contraband; proceeds of criminal activity; and the instrumentalities of crime. 15 6 Pure contraband, Justice Stevens explained, is property of which possession constitutes a crime.
157
While he acknowledged the government's remedial interest in confiscating such property irrespective of the owner's blameworthiness, he noted that a car was not contraband. 158 Justice Stevens next explained that the second category of forfeitable goods, proceeds of criminal activity, had traditionally covered only stolen property, which was justifiably confiscated and returned to the original owner upon restitutionary grounds. 15 9 He noted that the enlargement of the category to cover earnings from various illegal activities was not problematic because most of the federal forfeiture statutes include protections for innocent owners. 160 Furthermore, he found the inclusion of the innocent owner provision in the federal statutes to be persuasive of the notion that fairness requires consideration of an innocent owner's property rights.' 6 1 Finally, Justice Stevens noted that forfeiture in the third category, property used in the commission of crime, is more problematic. 62 He reasoned that forfeiture of such property can have a very broad reach and the government's remedial interest in confiscation is less evident. 163 Reviewing the admiralty precedents in this category, Justice Stevens concluded that they were distinguishable from Mrs. Bennis' case for two reasons. 164 166 Justice Stevens emphasized that, on one occasion, the car merely served as an enclosure for the sexual act, which could have occurred anywhere.' 67 Thus, he felt that the nexus between the crime and the property was insufficient to justify forfeiture. 168 Next, Justice Stevens criticized the State's attempt to categorize the forfeiture of the Bennis automobile as purely remedial. 169 He noted that confiscation of the car in no way prevented Mr. Bennis from engaging a prostitute in other venues; nor was the car itself a "nuisance" without the sexual activity.' 7 0 Thus, he concluded that Michigan's remedial interest did not justify the confiscation.
17 '
In the second part of his dissent, Justice Stevens voiced his belief that "[f] undamental fairness" prohibited the punishment of innocent individuals. 172 He asserted that the majority mischaracterized the rule of the Court's prior holdings as mandating an owner's strict liability for wrongful use of his property. 173 Furthermore, he noted that the Austin Court surveyed the same precedents and concluded that each decision rested, at a minimum, on the belief that the property owner was negligent in allowing his property to be misused. 174 As further support for his proposition that the forfeiture offended due process, Justice Stevens noted the punitive nature of forfeiture and cited cases in which, albeit in other contexts, the Court determined that a person could not constitutionally be punished without a showing of wrongdoing. 176 He suggested that the Court should now hold, as it always had assumed, that due process requires proof of guilt for the imposition of punishment. 177 Furthermore, Justice Stevens opined that the facts of the case demonstrated that Mrs. Bennis was truly innocent; thus, he concluded that the "seizure constituted an arbitrary deprivation of property without due process of law." 1 7
Justice Stevens concluded his dissent by stating that the forfeiture clearly violated the Eighth Amendment. 179 First, he criticized the majority's decision as "dramatically at odds with" the holding in Austin. I 0 He noted that even a modest penalty is out of proportion to Mrs. Bennis' guilt. 1 ' Although Justice Stevens declined to draw a bright line between the permissible and impermissible forfeiture of an innocent owner's property, he felt that the "blatant unfairness" of the Bennis forfeiture made it unconstitutional.
182
E. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S DISSENT
In a separate dissent, Justice Kennedy addressed the well-recognized tradition of forfeiture under maritime and admiralty law. 183 He also noted its justification of compensating the injuries caused by the vessels and the difficulty of locating the vessels' owners or ascertaining the owner's culpability. 1 84 However, he emphasized that even the tradition of admiralty forfeiture law could not justify a rule stating that, in all instances, a vessel may be seized for criminal activity conducted without the owner's consent or knowledge. 1 85 Thus, he reasoned that the Court could maintain the validity of its admiralty forfeiture deci-CVIL FORFEITURE sions without extending their application to Mrs. Bennis's case.' 8 6 Moreover, he distinguished Bennis from the admiralty precedents because the Bennis vehicle was not used to transport contraband. 187 Justice Kennedy expressed his view that the forfeiture did not meet the requirements of due process because the Michigan Supreme Court did not premise its decision to abate the vehicle on Mrs. Bennis's negligence or complicity with respect to her husband's illegal activity.' 8 8 Justice Kennedy concluded that nothing in the record supported the notion "that the value of her co-ownership is so insignificant as to be beneath the law's protection." 189 V. ANALYSIS This Note argues that although the majority's opinion claimed to be grounded in a "long and unbroken line" of precedent upholding the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property, the decision actually and unnecessarily extended the applicability of its prior decisions. Had the majority examined and applied the rationales underlying prior cases, it would have determined that the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis's interest in the automobile was unjustified. Instead, the Court perpetuated the unfairness admittedly resulting from punishing one who is not guilty of wrongdoing.
This Note also argues that the majority failed to address the limitation that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment imposed on the forfeiture in this case. The Court should have recognized that the forfeiture was at least partially punitive and, under Austin, remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether the punishment was unconstitutionally excessive.
A. FORFEITURE OF MRS. BENNIS'S INTEREST IN THE CAR IS NOT
JUSTIFIED
The majority's interpretation and application of the innocent owner forfeiture precedents reflects a superficial and overly-broad reading of those cases.' 9 0 Furthermore, the Bennis case is distinguishable from the precedents on which the majority rely. 19 ' Thus, the majority could have determined the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis's interest in the vehicle to be unconstitutional without overruling the admiralty
